Research Catalog

Details

Description

1. xx, 316 pages : illustrations; 24 cm

Summary

1. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable, and illegal, to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation. -- Publisher website.

Series statement

1. Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Uniform title

1. Cambridge studies in comparative politics.

Subject

1. Economic policy
2. Wahlverhalten
3. Finance, Public > Political aspects
4. Political science > Economic aspects
5. Internationaler Vergleich
6. Demokratie
7. Politics, Practical > Economic aspects
8. Verteilungspolitik
9. Political ethics
10. Manipulation
11. Klientelismus
12. Wahl
13. Political planning > Economic aspects
14. Broker

Contents

1. Between clients and citizens: puzzles and concepts in the study of distributive politics -- Gaps between theory and fact -- A theory of broker-mediated distribution -- Testing the theory of broker-mediated distribution -- A disjunction between the strategies of leaders and brokers? -- Clientelism and poverty -- Party leaders against the machine -- What killed vote buying in Britain and the United States -- What's wrong with buying votes? -- Appendix A : Argentina brokers' survey -- Appendix B : Argentina voters' survey -- Appendix C : Venezuela voters' survey and the Maisanta database -- Appendix D : India voters' survey.

Call number

1. JFE 15-6579

Bibliography (note)

1. Includes bibliographical references (pages 299-310) and index.

Author

1. Stokes, Susan Carol.

Title

1. Brokers, voters, and clientelism : the puzzle of distributive politics / Susan C. Stokes, Yale University, Thad Dunning, Yale University, Marcelo Nazareno, National University of Córdoba, Argentina, Valeria Brusco, National University of Córdoba, Argentina.

Publisher

1. New York, N.Y. : Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Type of content

1. text

Type of medium

1. unmediated

Type of carrier

1. volume

Series

1. Cambridge studies in comparative politics
2. Cambridge studies in comparative politics.

Bibliography

1. Includes bibliographical references (pages 299-310) and index.

LCCN

1. 2013007954

Other standard identifier

1. 40022810456
2. 9781107660397

ISBN

1. 9781107042209 (hardback)
2. 1107042208 (hardback)
3. 9781107660397 (pbk.)
4. 1107660394 (pbk.)

Research call number

1. JFE 15-6579